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CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The author feels it is time to start identifying who is to operate the National Missile Defense (NMD) System, and to provide a small cadre with facilities at or near the treaty compliant Anti Ballistic Missile site. The authority to accomplish this is under the purview of the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The paper includes justification for a "pathfinder" deployment concept tied to current strategy, cost tradeoff, and operational user involvement. The major objective is to reduce the amount of time it takes to deploy a NMD contingency deployment. The goal is to accomplish and fulfill the BMDO vision for an emergency deployment within two years. Actual expense for the "pathfinder" concept is not a consideration at this time other than to minimize the costs prior to a deployment decision. The recommendation is to approve resources to allow development of the emergency deployment concept.

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NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

The author feels it is vital to start strategic planning for the development of operational facilities and identifying staff for National Missile Defense (NMD) operations. This idea is more of a concept to get early involvement by operational staff than actual facility development. As such, it requires actual involvement of a US Army air defense cadre and a base of operations: for example, National Guard soldiers living near and working at the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defense treaty compliance site. The purpose of the cadre presence is to smooth the path and reduce the ABM deployment time. Accordingly, the theme of my idea is called "pathfinder" to depict a readiness path toward a contingency operational capability (COC). The NMD cadre mission and objective are to incrementally build, yet avoid unnecessary infrastructure, and provide for the general contingency deployment needs on site.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the agency responsible for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) development is the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The Director is the Acquisition Executive and has Planning, Programming and Budgeting responsibility (1-1). The BMDO mission and responsibility are to manage, direct, and execute a broad

spectrum of Ballistic Missile Defense programs.

These include;

- Concurrent development and expediting of critical technology into and for BMD weapon systems.
- Ensuring the deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems.
- Ensuring an effective National Missile Defense capability, with a contingency plan to deploy a subset of that capability if directed.

The emphasis is on the BMDO mission to deploy an NMD capability, if directed. The National Missile Defense (NMD) program has a do not deploy and a contingency deployment mandate. Now there is little taking place to develop the middle of the road mandate on physical infrastructure needed by the operational forces. My proposal is to correct this by having BMDO provide a low budget deployment infrastructure. BMDO support for is needed to elevate the effort's priority and the allocation of resources. Also needed is confirmation of the need for an ABM capability and a determination of where offsetting funds will come from to pay for it.

During the cold war with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Nations, the United States abandoned ownership of Anti Ballistic Missile Defense infrastructure, considering it non-effective. The 100 interceptor missiles, and the battle management and control infrastructure was not an effective defense. Especially against thousands of warheads targeting the U.S. The alternative was

reliance on an offensive strategy. This meant having and sustaining a large Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) arsenal with nuclear warheads. This offsetting power approach was appropriately called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Eventually the U.S. and the Soviet Union started treaty negotiations to eliminate ICBMs. Today the elimination of missiles is taking place. Unfortunately, elimination of these missiles only means the end of the MAD defense strategy. As stated earlier, the U.S. never fielded a ABM capability. Do we still need a true defense scaled to the threat?

The U.S. does not have an ABM treaty with all countries. Many third world countries have imported technology and missile boosters that threaten the US. This threat is less in number than what the Soviet Union had. However many Americans believe that some countries would not hesitate to target the U.S. Unfortunately, the same Americans believe the U.S. has a missile defense system.

I think that if a missile attack is possible, then the U.S. must have an appropriate countermeasure in place. The uncertainty of when it is needed is not relevant. Preparation and readiness are the only things' relevant. The U.S. must build the capability needed, starting today.

The elimination of one Strategic Missile Wing of Minuteman Missiles would pay for a COC. Although I do not have the data, I believe avoiding paying to sustain the ICBM force for two years would pay for the entire NMD infrastructure.

DISCUSSION

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Military components are, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense direction, conducting ABM development work as a Technology Readiness Program effort. The NMD Technology effort will achieve a near perfect paper ABM capability around the turn of the century. The design engineers, simulation staff and materiel program management staff will then be ready to address future needs or direction to deploy.

Assume for a moment the Secretary of Defense makes a deployment decision. The next development steps before deployment can start are force structure, logistics considerations, training, environmental impacts, land procurement, site preparations and facility construction and so. This product then becomes the treaty compliant NMD capability and represents the first integrated and qualified operational capability. This approach is the classical way systems acquisition evolves. This effort follows a deliberate operations plan based on tasking identified in early Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

Contingency Deployment: The DPG rarely contains strategic contingency deployment planning for a new system. For this reason contingency planning never gets past the programmer and resource boards. Contingency issues are out-prioritized by known needs because of limited resources. BMDO has DoD direction "to

develop options for, and deploy NMD when directed" (1-1). DoD constraints on technology usually mean deployment is never an objective, and contingency needs have to occur before funds are appropriated. Accordingly, the NMD deployment activity lacks resources. BMDO now has a challenge and opportunity to come up with a viable programmatic response for a contingency deployment, to include the operator.

The solution is to treat technology and deployment as two separate but concurrent technology efforts. In this new order for NMD technology, deployment becomes a contingency readiness objective just as the development of NMD technology is a readiness objective. My idea is to plan, program and budget for a strategic incremental approach, but not deployment. The focus is on ensuring the deployment (site, people, logistics, production planning, etc.) foundation is ready when needed.

Although not official BMDO policy, it is BMDO's vision to do the appropriate things to shorten the time to get to a COC. Again, this means operational readiness at a single site, with a defensive architecture within four years. To reach this goal, it is necessary to cut by 50% the latest current deployment threshold estimates of six to eight years for an operational capability certification.

One option already in the planning strategy is a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability for training and operational integration. This could take place in FY 99, but requires applying streamlined application and interpretation of

DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 policies and DOD 5000.2-M documentation to do (1-2d2).

CONCLUSIONS

BMDO should address the DoD-mandated nondeployment issue relative to the potential FY 96-99 term operational infrastructure needed for a COC. A military force and support cadre is needed to expedite a COC beddown. The materiel developers will help the cadre to resolve problems and to integrate system operation. The cadre must have exposure and experience from working with the NMD testers on real hardware. Construction of a pathfinder control facility at or near the proposed ABM site should be an on line system. Connections are with the National Test Bed during NMD war games and simulations is another experience gaining requirement. The need for an NMD control facility exists no matter what the final ABM architectures are selected. Initial start-up costs are offset by cost reduction in the ICBM arsenal.

RECOMMENDATION

The recommendation is to proceed toward the UOES FY 99 goal and to start developing the "pathfinder" concept in FY 96. During the earlier pathfinder phase, focus should include on site cadre help in identifying operational performance, requirements and BMC3 technology validation as opposed to on site hardware integration.

Hold off a decision on the UOES until parity is reached between the threat driven requirement and a good materiel

solution. If a need for a COC is more critical, further NMD development should include a decision to build a UOES capability. If the COC (Contingency Operations Capability) need are not critical, then the decision may be to stay with pathfinder enhancements. This option avoids the cost to build and deploy the UOES. Another benefit is that by continuing with the pathfinder could avoid producing unneeded NMD contingency technologies and allow proceeding to the next level of technology.

I recommend continuing, for as long as possible, the NMD pathfinder effort as a low-budget steady growth project with a phased milestone schedule. Continually expand the operational capability on a path toward the next level of validated technology requirements. Along this path, the "pathfinder" serves as a surrogate deployment for an NMD system technology evolution.

Avoid the hard and more costly infrastructure and incurring acquisition overhead costs until a validated need is presented by the "pathfinder cadre" (total LCC analysis, specialty engineering, supportability, etc.). For the longer term, I recommend a support infrastructure that involves developing contractors as well as military development and support staff.

Avoid construction modernization at the Stanley R. Micklesen Safeguard Complex (SRSMC) for as long as possible to avoid the start-up costs associated with upgrading real property and utilities. One recommendation is to require the pathfinder cadre

to survey facilities located near the SRMSC site. It is common knowledge that one or both bases near the SRMSC may be affected by Base Realignment and Closure. The two adjacent bases have excellent facilities and would avoid the huge start-up costs associated with SRMSC modernization. This would also allow an economical base of operations to work from while the NMD threat and technology issues sort themselves out. The cadre and even the follow on operational force would also have an excellent personnel support base and selection of surplus ICBM support equipment.

Recommended "pathfinder" growth includes developing contractors to have interface capability, physically interfacing, or electronically linking to the "pathfinder" test site for real world type testing. This link up is a means of justifying advanced technology enhancement efforts in a UOES follow-on contract. This effort should complement, support or integrate as necessary to "flesh out" the UOES program. The recommendation is for the BMDO Director to direct and authorize program resources for the pathfinder idea as discussed in this paper.

REFERENCES

1. DoD (Department of Defense) Directive 5134.9
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, June 14, 1994
2. DoD Directive 5000.1, *Defense Acquisition*, February 23, 1991
3. DoD Directive 5000.2, *Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures*,
February 23, 1991.